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Abstract
Individuals exhibit preferences for randomization if they prefer ran-
dom mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Such prefer-
ences provide the foundation of various models of uncertainty aversion.
However, it has to our knowledge not been empirically investigated
whether uncertainty-averse decision makers indeed exhibit such prefer-
ences. Here, we examine the relationship experimentally. We find that
uncertainty aversion is not positively associated with preferences for
randomization. Moreover, we observe choices that are not consistent
with the prevailing theories of uncertainty aversion: a non-negligible
number of uncertain-averse subjects seem to dislike randomization.
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1 Introduction
The canonical framework for economists to model choice behavior is that of
subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann,
1963). Ellsberg (1961) challenged this framework by suggesting a series of
experiments. Consider, for example, two urns that are filled with yellow and
white balls. In one urn, half of the balls are yellow, the other white. In
the other urn, the proportion of yellow and white balls is unknown. A ball
is drawn and subjects receive 100$ if they guess the color correctly. Many
subjects are indifferent between yellow and white but prefer betting on the
urn with known proportions (“risky urn”) to betting on the urn with un-
known proportions (“uncertain urn”). They are uncertainty-averse and their
choices violate subjective expected utility theory; moreover, their behavior is
not consistent with probabilistic sophistication in the sense of Machina and
Schmeidler (1992).
In a direct comment on Ellsberg’s thought experiment Raiffa (1961) sug-
gested the following. After drawing a ball from the uncertain urn, subjects
flip a fair coin to decide on which color to bet. By tossing a fair coin and
betting on yellow when heads appear and on white otherwise, the objective
chances of winning the bet with the uncertain urn are 50% and thus identical
to those with the risky urn. This seems to contradict the idea that betting
on the risky urn is preferable to betting on the uncertain urn. Indeed, Raiffa
proposes the randomization to “undermine the confidence” of uncertainty-
averse subjects in their choices. However, subjects who value bets on the
risky urn and randomized bets on the uncertain urn equally may still ex-
hibit uncertainty aversion, if they prefer tossing a coin rather than betting
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on either white or yellow when they face uncertainty. In short, subjects may
agree with Raiffa’s argument and still be uncertainty-averse if they display
preferences for randomization.
In view of the overwhelming empirical evidence indicating uncertainty
aversion (see the survey article by Camerer and Weber, 1992), various al-
ternatives to subjective expected utility theory have been proposed. The
most prominent are Choquet expected utility, which has been axiomatized
by Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992), and
maxmin expected utility, which was justified by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff, and Ozdenoren (2000). While both
approaches can explain the Ellsberg paradox, they have very different predic-
tions with respect to preferences for randomization. Eichberger and Kelsey
(1996), Ghirardato (1997) and Klibanoff (2001) analyze the relationship be-
tween uncertainty aversion and preferences for randomization from a theoret-
ical point of view. However, it has to our knowledge never been empirically
investigated. Here, we examine the relationship between uncertainty aversion
and preferences for randomization in an experimental study.
Subjects in our experiment were faced with three sources of uncertainty:
a coin, a risky urn and an uncertain urn. We offered subjects lotteries based
on these sources and elicited their reservation prices. We classify subjects
as uncertainty-averse if the reservation prices for lotteries involving the risky
urn are higher than those involving the uncertain urn. In addition, we of-
fered a lottery in the spirit of Raiffa that involved deliberate randomization.
By comparing the reservation price of this lottery to an appropriate lottery
without such randomization, we determine whether subjects are willing to
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pay for randomization and thus exhibit preferences for randomization.
Our main finding is that uncertainty aversion is not positively associ-
ated with preferences for randomization. The hypothesis that uncertainty
aversion and preferences for randomization are positively related is rejected
at any conventional level in favor of a negative relationship. This finding
contrasts with a wide-spread notion of uncertainty aversion. In his semi-
nal article, Schmeidler (1989) relates uncertainty aversion to the idea that
an individual who is indifferent between two bets under uncertainty prefers
a mixture of these bets.1 This idea is directly imposed as an axiom on
preferences in maxmin models (e.g Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989, Casadesus-
Masanell, Klibanoff, and Ozdenoren, 2000) and several generalizations of it
(Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006, Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud, 2008). The rationale behind this notion of uncertainty aversion is
that the individual likes smoothing expected utility across outcomes. It may
also be interpreted as saying that individuals will in general prefer the mix-
ture, because it allows to hedge against uncertainty. Our finding indicates
that this rationale only explains the behavior of very few subjects.
One popular way to model uncertainty aversion is to employ Choquet
expected utility models with convex capacities. Whether uncertainty aver-
sion implies preferences for randomization in this case depends on how the
randomization device is modeled. There are two approaches. The first ap-
proach represents the randomization device in the tradition of Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) as part of the consequence space. The second approach
1See Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) for alternative definitions of
uncertainty aversion.
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models the randomization device as an extension of the state space a` la Sav-
age (1954). We refer to the first approach as C (consequence space) approach
and the second as S (state space) approach. The distinction does not mat-
ter for decision makers who satisfy the axioms of subjective expected utility
theory. However, for uncertainty-averse decision makers, it has important
repercussions. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) investigate these repercussions
in Choquet expected utility models. They show that uncertainty-averse de-
cision makers who are indifferent between two acts prefer randomization in
the C-approach but must be indifferent with respect to randomization (or:
randomization neutral) in the S-approach.
The question of whether uncertainty-averse subjects exhibit preferences
for randomization is of importance to an emerging literature that examines
the consequences of uncertainty aversion in different economic applications.
Those applications include financial markets (see for example Dow and Wer-
lang 1992, Epstein and Wang 1994, Chen and Epstein 2002, Nishimura and
Ozaki 2007, Epstein and Schneider 2007), contract theory (see Mukerji 1998
and Ghirardato 1994), auction theory (see Lo 1998, Chen, Katuscak, and Oz-
denoren 2007, and Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape 2007), and search economics
(Nishimura and Ozaki, 2004). Preferences for randomization affect, in par-
ticular, whether mixed equilibria can be strict in the presence of uncertainty-
averse subjects. For instance, Klibanoff (1996) and Lo (1996) adopt the view
that uncertainty-averse subjects have a strict incentive to randomize, while
Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Marinacci (2000)
argue against preferences for randomization. While the preferences for ran-
domization of uncertainty-averse decision makers matter for the choice of the
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theoretical approach (C or S) and affect applications, little is known about
them.
Our second finding directly relates to the differing predictions by S-
and C-approach and concerns the attitude toward randomization among
uncertainty-averse subjects who are indifferent between betting on yellow
and white. We find that a considerable fraction of them does not value ran-
domization. The hypothesis that uncertainty-averse subjects have an equal
chance of preferring or being neutral with respect to randomization is rejected
at any conventional level in favor of them being neutral.
This finding indicates that the S-approach is more suited to describe the
behavior of the subjects in our experiment. However, Klibanoff (2001) points
out an interesting feature of this approach: subjects, who are uncertainty-
averse and regard the randomization device as risky,2 must violate a prop-
erty called stochastic independence. This means that such subjects view the
outcomes of the coin and the uncertain urn as correlated. If we thus rep-
resent preferences of uncertainty-averse subjects using the S-approach and
if we believe that they view the coin as risky, they should perceive coin
and uncertain urn as dependent. As a first step to see whether uncertainty-
averse subjects violate independence more often, we compare their behavior
to uncertainty-neutral subjects. While uncertainty-averse subjects exhibit a
somewhat higher tendency to violate independence, the finding is not signif-
icant.
Our experiment also raises a puzzle: there are a considerable number of
2Risky means here that they can assign probabilities to the outcomes of the random-
ization device.
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subjects who are uncertainty-averse and dislike randomization. This behavior
cannot be explained by either of the two approaches to uncertainty aversion.
We suggest some explanations and provide tentative evidence on what may
cause this behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the experimental design and important definitions. In Section 3, we derive
our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results. The article ends with some
concluding remarks.
2 Experimental design
In this section, we describe the sources of uncertainty used and the lottery
tickets offered to the subjects. We also discuss how we elicited reservation
prices for the lottery tickets and define key concepts in terms of observable
behavior.
Sources of uncertainty
Lotteries are based on three devices:
• a coin provided by one of the subjects,
• a risky urn R with 20 table tennis balls of which ten were white and
ten were yellow, and
• an uncertain urn U with 20 table tennis balls with an unknown pro-
portion of yellow and white balls.
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Subjects were informed that only white and yellow balls are used in the
experiment. The contents of urn R were shown to the subjects before the
experiment, while the contents of urn U were only revealed after the exper-
iment. During the experiment, both urns were placed on a table in view of
the subjects to convince them that the content were not manipulated.
Lottery tickets
During the experiment subjects were offered different lottery tickets. We
informed subjects that the lottery tickets involve one or more of the three
sources of uncertainty. They did not know, however, how many and which
tickets they would face. In the following we explain the lottery tickets in the
same sequence in which they were presented and evaluated by the subjects.
In the description of the tickets, as in the experiment, prizes are expressed
in Taler, our experimental currency unit. The first two tickets are defined on
the outcome of the coin toss.
1. Head ticket, H: 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands heads up and
nothing otherwise.
2. Tails ticket, T : 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands tails up and
nothing otherwise.
The heads and tails tickets are later used to check whether subjects regard
the coin as fair. The next two tickets involve the risky urn.
3. White ticket for urn R, WR: 100 Taler are paid if the drawn ball
from urn R is white and nothing otherwise.
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4. Yellow ticket for urn R, Y R, 100 Taler are paid if the drawn ball
from urn R is yellow and nothing otherwise.
These two tickets help us to detect whether subjects are indifferent between
yellow and white when the ball is drawn from the urn with known propor-
tions. The fifth and sixth ticket are defined on the outcome of a draw from
the uncertain urn.
5. Yellow ticket for urn U, Y U : 100 Taler are paid if the drawn ball
from urn U is yellow and nothing otherwise.
6. White ticket for urn U, WU : 100 Taler are paid if the drawn ball
from urn U is white and nothing otherwise.
Since the draw from urn U involves more uncertainty than the draw from
urn R, the difference in reservation prices of the lottery tickets for R and U
is informative about the subject’s attitude toward uncertainty.
The next ticket was designed in the spirit of Raiffa’s idea. It involves two
sources of uncertainty: the coin and the uncertain urn. The subject always
receives a ticket for urn U. Whether this ticket will be yellow or white is
determined by flipping the coin. Since the color of the ticket changes with
the outcome of the coin toss, we use the name chameleon ticket.
7. Chameleon ticket for urn U, CU : If the coin lands heads up, the
subject receives a yellow ticket for urn U. If the coin lands tails up the
subject receives a white ticket for urn U.3
3Put differently, the subject receives 100 Taler in two cases: if the coin lands heads up
and the drawn ball from urn U is yellow and if the coin lands tails up and the ball drawn
from urn U is white. In the other two cases, the subject receives nothing.
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By comparing the reservation price for the chameleon ticket with that of a
yellow or white ticket for urn U, we can draw some inference about a subject’s
preferences for randomization.
The last ticket combines a draw from urn U with a coin toss and the
reservation price for the heads ticket.4
8. Combination ticket for U: If the drawn ball is yellow, then the
subject receives a heads ticket. If the drawn ball is white, then the
subject receives its reservation price for a heads ticket.5
The comparison of this combination ticket with a heads ticket later gives
us some indication whether the subject regards urn U and the coin flip as
independent.
Eliciting reservation prices
A critical experimental design question is how to elicit the reservation price.
We used the following procedure. For each lottery, the subject had to make
twenty choices. The first choice was between a ticket for the lottery and a
payment of 2.5 Taler. The second was between a ticket and a payment of 7.5
Taler etc. The payments offered to the subject increased in steps of 5 Taler
until the last choice, in which the subject had to choose between a ticket
and 97.5 Taler. The point at which the subject switches from the ticket
to the payment then reveals the reservation price (up to 2.5 Taler). All of
4How the reservation price is elicited is described in the next section.
5Put differently, the subject receives 100 Taler if the coin lands heads up and the drawn
ball from urn U is yellow; the subject gets its reservation price for a heads ticket if the
drawn ball from urn U is white; and nothing otherwise.
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the subject’s choices were implemented and affected the subject’s payoff. To
ensure independence, a separate draw was carried out for each ticket.
Many experiments employ less time-consuming and laborious elicitation
mechanisms that combine the choices over lotteries with additional random-
ization. An example is the method by Holt and Laury (2002) who randomly
select one of the choices to be payoff relevant. Another popular mecha-
nism, which has recently been used in experiments on uncertainty aversion
(Halevy, 2007; Hey, Lotito, and Maffioletti, 2008), is that of Becker, DeG-
root, and Marschak (1964). In the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism,
the subject receives a lottery ticket and states the reservation price. Then,
a random price offer is generated and the subject has to sell the ticket if the
offer exceeds the stated price.
Despite the considerable effort involved,6 we decided to pay all decisions
rather than employing a mechanism that relies on additional randomization.
We do so for two reasons. First, as Karni and Safra (1987) point out a method
based on additional randomization, such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism, is no longer guaranteed to elicit the true (subjective) value of
a lottery once the independence axiom is violated.7 Uncertainty-averse sub-
jects, however, violate the independence axiom. As we are interested in the
reservation prices of uncertainty-averse subjects, we employ a mechanism
that truly reveals these prices even if the independence axiom is violated.
6Up to 120 draws and 80 coin flips are needed in order to determine the outcome of
the twenty choices for the eight lottery tickets.
7A similar observation has been made by Holt (1986). The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism also fails to elicit true valuations if the compound lottery axiom is violated
(Segal, 1988).
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Second, had we introduced another source of randomness, all lotteries faced
by the subject would have been compound lotteries; none would have been
purely based on the three sources that we are interested in (coin, uncertain
urn, risky urn). By implementing all choices, we avoided that preferences for
randomization interact with other sources of randomness.
Definitions
Denote the reservation price for lottery ticket t by v(t), where t is the ab-
breviation for tickets used earlier: t ∈ {H,T, Y R,WR, Y U ,WU , CU}. In line
with standard practice, we say a subject is uncertainty-averse if she assigns
a lower value to tickets from the uncertain rather than the risky urn.
Definition 1 (Uncertainty aversion). A subject is
uncertainty-averse if min
(
v(Y R), v(WR)
)
> max
(
v(Y U), v(WU)
)
,
uncertainty-loving if max
(
v(Y R), v(WR)
)
< min
{
v(Y U), v(WU)
}
,
and uncertainty-neutral if v(Y R) = v(WR) = v(Y U) = v(WU).
The definition simply reflects the idea that a subject who values both tickets
for urn R more than those for urn U prefers to know more about the urn.
Analogously, a subject is uncertainty-loving if she generally prefers tickets for
urn U to tickets for urn R. Notice that the order induced by this definition
is not complete.
Taking up the definition from the introduction, we say a subject prefers
randomization if she values the chameleon ticket more than the white and
the yellow ticket for urn U.
Definition 2 (Randomization preferences). A subject
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prefers randomization if v(CU) > max
(
v(Y U), v(WU)
)
,
dislikes randomization if v(CU) < min
(
v(Y U), v(WU)
)
and is randomization-neutral if v(CU) = v(Y U) = v(WU).
For a subject who values yellow and white tickets for urn U equally, this
definition collapses to a simple comparison between the chameleon ticket
and a plain ticket for urn U, e.g. a white ticket. If a subject who values
yellow and white tickets for urn U equally also regards the coin as fair, we
say that it has symmetric preferences.
Definition 3. A subject has symmetric preferences if v(H) = v(T ) and
v(WU) = v(Y U).
Symmetric preferences play an important role because the two leading
approaches generate specific and different predictions for subjects with sym-
metric preferences. These differences are explained in the next section.
3 Predictions
In order to motivate the first hypothesis, consider the following definition
by Schmeidler (1989), which serves as the backbone for various models of
uncertainty aversion. Let f and g be acts, i.e. mappings that assign to every
event a probability distribution over outcomes.8 Next, we define for any
α ∈ (0, 1) an α-mixture over f and g such that the decision maker receives
bet f with probability α and g with probability (1 − α). Let  represent
8For instance, a white ticket for urn U is an act that assigns probability one to 100
Taler and zero to 0 Taler on the event “ball drawn from urn U is white” and probability
zero to 100 Taler and one to 0 Taler otherwise.
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the preferences over bets. Then, a subject is uncertainty-averse according to
Schmeidler’s definition if for all α ∈ (0, 1) and all f  g it holds that
αf + (1− α)g  g.
Notice that this definition is weak in the sense that it also encompasses
subjective expected utility maximizers for whom f ∼ g implies αf + (1 −
α)g ∼ g. For subjects who violate the independence axiom, in our setup those
who prefer to bet on the risky rather than the uncertain urn, the mixture
of f and g is strictly preferred. Conversely, a preference for betting on the
uncertain urn is reflected by a strict preference for the pure acts rather than
the mixture.
This close relationship between uncertainty aversion and preferences for
randomization suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1 Uncertainty aversion is positively associated with prefer-
ences for randomization.
As explained earlier, there are two different approaches for modeling uncer-
tainty aversion (C-approach and S-approach). Depending on which approach
is used, one gets specific but differing predictions about the preferences for
randomization of uncertainty-averse decision makers. We can evaluate these
predictions against the benchmark that preferences for randomization are
randomly distributed. This benchmark leads to the following null hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis H2O Uncertainty-averse subjects with symmetric preferences
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are equally likely to prefer randomization or to be randomization-neutral.
In contrast to this hypothesis, uncertainty aversion in the C-approach re-
quires subjects with symmetric preferences to prefer randomization. This
suggests the following alternative:
Hypothesis H2C Uncertainty-averse subjects with symmetric preferences
are more likely to prefer randomization.
In the S-approach, randomization plays a less prominent role and it is not
obvious how uncertainty aversion relates to preferences for randomization.
However, Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) have shown that –unlike in the C-
approach– subjects with symmetric preferences are randomization neutral
(see Proposition 3.2 in Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996). This leads to our sec-
ond alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2S Uncertainty-averse subjects with symmetric preferences
are more likely to be randomization-neutral.
Klibanoff (2001) relates the different predictions of S- and C-approach
to violations of stochastic independence. He starts with the observation
that subjects should regard a randomization device as risky and independent
from other sources of uncertainty. He shows that it is possible to model
such a stochastic independent randomization device and uncertainty aversion
simultaneously in the C-approach but not in the S-approach (see his Theorem
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2). Suppose that we model the behavior of uncertainty-averse subjects with
the S-approach. If we additionally believe that the subjects regard the coin
as risky, Klibanoff’s result implies that they violate stochastic independence.
By comparing the combination and heads ticket, we can observe viola-
tions of stochastic independence. Recall that the combination ticket involves
both the coin and the uncertain urn, where the draw from the urn only affects
whether the subject gets an actual heads ticket or the certainty equivalent of
the heads ticket. A subject, who regards coin and uncertain urn as indepen-
dent, should attach the same value to the combination and heads ticket. A
subject, who cannot separate the randomness involved in the coin flip from
that involved in the draw from the uncertain urn, will value the combination
ticket differently than the heads ticket.
Uncertainty-averse subjects violate stochastic independence in the S-
approach and uncertainty-neutral subjects do not. Accordingly, we take the
behavior of uncertainty-neutral subjects as a benchmark and formulate the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis H3: Randomization-neutral subjects with symmetric prefer-
ences are more likely to value the combination ticket differently than the
heads ticket if they are uncertainty-averse rather than uncertainty neutral.
4 Implementation
We ran a total of 5 sessions with 90 subjects. All sessions were conducted in
the experimental laboratory at the University of Mannheim in late September
2008. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students who were randomly
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recruited from a pool of approximately 1000 subjects using an e-mail recruit-
ment system. Each subject only participated in one of the sessions. Reserva-
tion prices were elicited electronically using the software z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
After the subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly seated
at the computer terminals. Instructions were read out loud and ticket types
were practically explained. Then, the subjects were given time to study the
instructions on their own. Finally, they were asked to answer a series of ques-
tions to test their understanding of the instructions. During all this time,
subjects could ask the experimenters clarifying questions. This part lasted
about 30 minutes. It was followed by the evaluation of the lottery tickets.
In order to simplify the input for subjects, we programmed a slider that
allowed them to specify the reservation price. The program then automati-
cally selected choices that were consistent with the reservation price. Using
the slider was not obligatory and a subject could arbitrary alter its choice
until he or she decided to finish evaluation of a specific lottery ticket. Af-
ter the evaluation of lottery tickets, we asked subjects questions about their
demographics and attitudes toward uncertainty. We also gave them some
problems to test their statistics knowledge and cognitive ability. Subjects
took about 30 minutes for this second part. The last and final part required
drawing balls and flipping coins in order to determine payoffs. With 8 types
of lottery tickets and twenty choices between ticket and fixed payment for
each type, subjects could obtain up to 160 tickets. This last part required
roughly 30 minutes so that the whole experiment lasted about 90 minutes.
At the end of the experiment, we paid each subject privately in cash. All
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payoffs were initially explained in Taler that were later converted using the
rate that 100 Taler=10 cents. Subjects earned on average 11.35e.
5 Results
Two subjects violate transitivity in their choices, which leaves us with 88
independent observations. Of those, we can classify 63 according our def-
inition of uncertainty-aversion. In line with previous experimental studies
(see Camerer and Weber, 1992), a large fraction of the subjects exhibit the
Ellsberg paradox and prefer betting on the risky urn to betting on the un-
certain urn (45 of 63 classifiable subjects). The behavior of eleven subjects
is consistent with subjective expected utility maximization and seven prefer
the uncertain urn.
Examining the relationship between uncertainty aversion and preferences
for randomization, we obtain the following main finding.
Result 1. Uncertainty aversion is not positively associated with preferences
for randomization.
Of the 88 subjects 58 can be classified according to their uncertainty aversion
and preferences for randomization. The relationship between the two is de-
picted in Table 1. From Hypothesis H1, we expect a positive relationship be-
tween preferences for randomization and uncertainty aversion. Accordingly,
observations should lie on the diagonal from the top-left to the bottom-right
of the table. Entries on the diagonal from the bottom-left to the top right,
however, are larger. The null hypothesis that uncertainty aversion and pref-
erences for randomization are independent or positively associated can be
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Table 1: Association between uncertainty aversion and preferences for ran-
domization
uncertainty Total
loving neutral averse
averse 1 0 14 15
randomization neutral 2 11 20 35
loving 2 0 9 8
Total 5 11 43 59
rejected at any conventional level (Fishers exact test has a p-value below
0.01); Goodman and Kruskal’s γ as well as Kendall’s τ , which measure the
association between the ordinally scaled uncertainty aversion and preferences
for randomization, are both negative and significant.
Of the 58 subjects whose preferences with regard to randomization and
uncertainty aversion can be classified, 42 have symmetric preferences. For
the next step, we restrict the analysis to these subjects in order to examine
the specific and differing predictions of the S and C-approach.
Result 2. Uncertainty-averse subjects with symmetric preferences are more
likely to be randomization-neutral rather than randomization-loving.
Twenty uncertainty-averse subjects with symmetric preferences exhibit pref-
erences for randomization that are predicted by prevailing theories. Sixteen
of these are randomization-neutral and their behavior is hence in line with
the S-approach. Only four out of the twenty show the behavior expected from
C-approach and are randomization-loving. The hypothesis that symmetric
and uncertainty-averse subjects are equally likely to be randomization-loving
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or neutral can be rejected at any conventional level:9 a significantly larger
fraction of subjects are randomization neutral.
Recall that based on a theorem by Klibanoff (2001), we hypothesized that
randomization-neutral subjects with symmetric preferences are more likely
to value the combination ticket differently than the heads ticket if they are
uncertainty-averse rather than uncertainty-neutral.
Result 3. Subjects with symmetric preferences are more likely to value the
combination ticket differently than the heads ticket if they are uncertainty-
averse rather than uncertainty neutral. The difference, however, is not sig-
nificant.
There is a total of 24 subjects with symmetric preferences who are randomi-
zation-neutral. Five of the 15 uncertainty-averse subjects violate stochastic
independence, amongst the nine uncertainty-neutral subjects, there is only
one. The difference, however, is not significant.10 This result provides some
indication that uncertainty-averse subjects are not particularly prone to vio-
lating stochastic independence. However, the test is not conclusive. In order
to check whether a subject regards the coin flip and the draw from the uncer-
tain urn as independent, one needs to observe the values of three additional
combination tickets. What varies amongst the required combination tickets
is the color of the ball that leads to a fixed payment and the side of the coin
that wins. It is possible that uncertainty-averse subjects are more likely to
violate stochastic independence for one of the other three variations, which
we do not examine in our experiment. However, it seems unlikely that the
9The respective binomial test has a p-value of 0.01.
10The two-sample test of proportion has a p-value of 0.11
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Figure 1: Attitude toward randomization amongst uncertainty-averse sub-
jects with symmetric preferences
color of the ball and the side of the coin, which did not matter for any other
decision of these subjects, matters with respect to the combination ticket.
In addition to these results, which directly relate to our hypotheses, we
also want to report on an unexpected finding. A priori, we expected the
share of randomization-averse subjects to be considerably smaller than one
third because the respective behavior is not backed by any theory.
Result 4. A non-negligible fraction of uncertainty-averse subjects dislikes
randomization.
Of the 41 uncertainty-averse subjects, 14 express a dislike for randomization.
If we restrict attention to the smaller group of subjects with symmetric pref-
erences to which the theoretical predictions apply, a similar picture emerges:
9 out of the 29 uncertainty-averse subjects prefer the pure lottery tickets over
the mixture—see Figure 1. In both cases, the share is statistically not dis-
tinguishable from one third at any conventional level and hence surprisingly
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large. The respective subjects prefer to know whether the ticket, which they
receive, is white or yellow—although they are indifferent between receiving
a white and a yellow ticket. While this behavior is widely spread amongst
uncertainty-averse subjects, it does not occur amongst uncertainty-neutral
subjects. It is this feature which leads to the negative relationship between
preferences for randomization and uncertainty aversion from Result 1.
There are a few tentative explanations for the observed behavior. We
briefly introduce these explanations and discuss them. First, subjects may
simply value more information. A ticket of known color may be preferred
to a ticket of unknown color (randomization aversion) just as a ticket for an
urn with known proportions is preferred to a ticket for an urn with unknown
proportions (uncertainty aversion).
Second, the chameleon ticket pertains to the most complicated lottery in
the experiment. Subjects may be less inclined to forgo money for a ticket that
they find difficult to analyze. There are some indications that this could be
the case. Amongst uncertainty-averse subjects, the dislike for randomization
is associated with the failure to solve a problem from Frederick’s cognitive-
reflection test (2005)—see Table 2.11
The complexity is partly due to the conditional structure of the chameleon
ticket. In our statistics questions, we asked the following related question:
What is the conditional probability that a four appears when a ten-sided fair
dice has been thrown and it is known that the number is even. Amongst
uncertainty-averse subjects who answer this question wrongly, the dislike for
11We asked the following question: A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
21
Randomization
solution averse
to problem no yes total
wrong 1 4 5
correct 30 10 40
total 31 14 45
Fisher’s exact test of association (one-
sided): P-value = 0.027.
Table 2: Randomization Aversion
and Cognitive Reflection
Randomization
probability averse
calculation no yes total
wrong 5 8 13
correct 26 6 32
total 31 14 45
Fisher’s exact test of association (one-
sided): P-value < 0.01.
Table 3: Randomization Aversion
and Statistics Knowledge
randomization is much more prevalent than for uncertainty-averse subjects
who answered correctly—see Table 3.
A third reason could be that subjects are randomization-neutral but fail
to remember the value for the benchmark, e.g. the white ticket for the
uncertain urn. This reason is unlikely since we provided subjects with a
history of their reservation prices. Moreover, one would expect deviations in
both directions, whereas more subjects express a distaste for randomization
rather than preferences for randomization.
Finally, the finding could be related to the loss of control associated with
the randomization device. Social psychologists argue that decision makers
sometimes prefer to keep control to using a randomization device (see Keren
and Teigen 2008). Whether decision makers like to maintain control seems to
depend on the circumstances: Dittmann, Ku¨bler, Maug, and Mechtenberg
(2008) find that experimental subjects are willing to pay a premium for
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exerting the right to vote even if the probability that this affects the outcome
is very low, while Cettolin and Riedl (2008) observe that subjects prefer a
random draw when having to decide between risky and uncertain prospects.
A conclusive answer to the question, which of these different ideas is best
suited to explain why uncertainty-averse subjects may dislike randomization,
is beyond the scope of our study and is left to future research.
6 Conclusions
We start our analysis with the classical observation from the two-color ex-
periment by Ellsberg (1961): individuals prefer to bet in situations about
which they are better informed. Existing explanations for such behavior
often rely on the idea that access to an objective randomization device mit-
igates the problem of lack of information. Accordingly, uncertainty-averse
individuals are supposed to exhibit preferences for randomization. The data
from our experiment, however, does not support this view: there is no posi-
tive association between uncertainty-aversion and preferences for randomiza-
tion. Uncertainty-averse subjects are more likely to be randomization-neutral
rather than randomization-loving. This implies that modeling uncertainty-
aversion in a Savage framework (S-approach) is better suited to describe
their behavior than modeling uncertainty-aversion using a consequence space
in the tradition of Anscombe-Aumann (C-approach). Neither of the two
approaches, however, explains another phenomenon observed in our experi-
ment: a considerable number of uncertainty-averse subjects exhibits a con-
tempt for randomization. This could indicate that for many subjects, the
23
randomization device does not reduce but enhances the problem of missing
information.
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